Moving Beyond the Donor Focus in MEL: A Case for Localizing MEL and Adding “Value.”

There are numerous reasons to monitor and evaluate interventions (programs and projects). Broadly speaking, monitoring and evaluation provides accountability for resources to (a) demonstrate how resources are being used and what the resources are delivering for key stakeholders and (b) help implementation teams derive insights to make resources “go further.” That said, monitoring and evaluation is strongly influenced by who monitors and evaluates. In this blog, I make a case for considering whose MEL voice is heard in data collection and analysis. The emphasis on who helps us not only to be more efficient and effective with MEL activities, but also to explicate why certain results matter (or not). I note the important role that local MEL colleagues play in orienting and refining MEL activities, with “local” referring to individuals that have a lived (not transient) experience in a country context, speak the local language(s), and/or intuitively relate to – and can navigate – culture and power dynamics.

In this blog, I make a case for considering whose MEL voice is heard in data collection and analysis.

What Do I Mean by Localizing MEL?

Localizing has had a strong and protracted presence in public discourse in the aid industry. From decolonializing aid to what localisation could look like, the aid industry has explored the purpose, value, and morality of localization. Practically, localization includes measures such as hiring local staff, transferring a greater percentage of programme costs to “local” organizations, and supporting local knowledge institutions, such as universities and think tanks, to serve as thought leaders. I believe a key aspect of localizing MEL is people.

Why Do Local MEL Experts Matter?

In many ways, it is intuitive that local experts add value. However, I find that the way we typically leverage the expertise of local MEL experts does not adequately reflect the real value they can add to MEL processes and outputs. Local MEL colleagues have expertise, access and reach, and trust, which means that local partners, communities, and local governments are often more willing to engage with them in meaningful ways. Access and trust facilitate iteration, trial-and-error, and more nimble data-collection processes. I am not suggesting that access and trust are inherent in relationships with local MEL colleagues. However, in my experience, local MEL experts have frequently expedited relationship-building and trust with local actors. These MEL experts speak the same language, are more likely to identify challenges in data collection (local hierarchies, for example), and are more likely to build informal strategies that help build ownership and greater engagement from those we seek to gather information from. I have found that these engagements have led to efficiencies and better-quality data that I might not have been able to gather myself.

More trusting relationships also help to maintain longer-term relationships with stakeholders, supporting evaluations and post-project engagement. Very importantly, partners derive value when engaging with local MEL experts on, for example, the provision of mentoring on how to measure change effectively. These partners can be reticent to reach out for clarification and support if the MEL expert is not local. Local MEL experts, I find, have provided value beyond simply gathering and validating data; they have given value back to local partners and stakeholders by upskilling in informal yet powerful ways. The informal, yet powerful, support provided by local MEL experts helps to build stronger local partner capabilities, which in turn can help balance power dynamics. This in itself is a moral imperative. Yet, the positive efficiencies and efficacy of MEL activities further strengthens the moral argument. 

Working More Substantively with Local MEL Experts

Local MEL experts facilitate access and trust (and, of course, expertise) that deliver better quality and more meaningful data. Trust and access can also help with post-project activities like evaluations and learning reports. Just as importantly, in an industry where most MEL experts extract rather than contribute, local MEL experts often informally mentor local partners and stakeholders to better understand MEL processes, and the value of MEL. The informal support helps address uneven power dynamics and strengthen local partner capabilities, adding intangible value. I make a case to bring more local MEL experts, more substantively into MEL activities, the value they bring is widespread – both tangible and intangible.

Syria’s National Dialogue Conference: Progress and Challenges

The President of Syria’s interim government, Ahmed al-Shara’a, recently announced the members who will make up the preparatory committee charged with coordinating the much-anticipated National Dialogue Conference. The committee will reportedly work to develop recommendations for the interim government about the form and composition of the conference – a date for which has not yet been set.

Preparatory Committee Selection

The preparatory committee is made up of seven members (five men and two women): Hassan al-Daghim, Maher Alloush, Mohammad Mosatet, Yousef al-Hajer, Mustafa Musa, Huda al-Atassi, and Hind Qabwat. The initial reactions of the public to the selected members has been mixed. On the one hand, some local observers have argued that the selected members are legitimate representatives of civil society, praising the inclusion of al-Atassi and Qabwat in particular – both of whom have a proven track-record of engaging with civil society and humanitarian work. On the other hand, concerns were also raised that some of the members were picked because on their close ties to – or alignment with – al-Shara’a. For example, al-Hajer previously served as the head of the political bureau of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Musa served the head of the Salvation Government’s Shura Council, and Alloush served in the recently disbanded Ahrar al-Sham: a Syrian National Army (SNA) faction that is known to enjoy positive ties with HTS. Public opinion has also divided about the process through which the members were appointed. While some observers criticized the seemingly unilateral manner through which al-Shara’a appointed the members, others suggested that this process was reasonable given the need to expedite the process and make progress.

Progress of Committee

While it is too early to judge the effectiveness of the committee, the approach taken thus far has yielded some positive signs. Specifically, the committee has quickly launched its engagement with Syrians across governorates, travelling to Homs on February 16 – only a couple of days after its establishment. The dialogue there was reportedly attended by 400 people. While the mechanism used to select the attendees remains unclear to Proximity, the attendees reportedly encompassed a diverse ethnic, political, and religious groups. The discussions covering a wide range of topics, including transitional justice, the constitution, institutional reform, political liberties, and the economy. The impressions of attendees were positive, noting that the committee acted as listeners and facilitators – allowing the attendees to voice their opinion. On Monday, two more sessions were held (in Tartous, and Lattakia), with the nature of the discussion appearing to be largely similar to that of Homs.

Notable in the discussions so far is the sequence in which they have been held, with Homs, Lattakia, and Tartous each having experienced instability and concern since the ouster of Bashar al-Assad. Moreover, given the concentration of persons and villages aligned with the al-Assad regime, the three governorates have also been the target of security campaigns aimed at eradicating remnants of al-Assad’s forces. There were also concerning incidents involving personal vendettas against remnants of the regime, which in some cases culminated in public executions. As such, the committee's sequencing is likely an attempt to (a) express its seriousness in prioritizing these tensions and (b) signal the government's investment in the inclusion of actors involved in these tensions – rather than excluding them as a punitive measure for their perceived alignment with the regime.

Following the dialogues, the committee will be tasked with nominating participants in the National Dialogue Conference. While the exact for this process remains unclear, the committee will reportedly nominate participants based on “expertise, public influence, and inclusivity.” The committee’s spokesperson, Hassan al-Daghim, noted that “no one will be invited based on religion, institutional ties, or party affiliations.” Implicit in these statements is the insistence on the official dissolution of any political or armed entities prior to their inclusion of the conference. This step has already been taken by the SNA and, more recently, the Syrian National Coalition, Negotiation Commission, and Syrian Interim Government. While this approach could open up a space for wider community participation while minimizing opportunities for political or armed groups attempting to co-opt the voices of ethno-religious groups in Syria, it also risks creating a situation where the committee (and al-Shara’a) is the one deciding what an inclusive and representative conference looks like – likely in a manner that fits its political interests.

Exclusion of SDF/DAANES

Concerns about inclusion are perhaps best reflected in the case of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES) – both of which appear to have been deliberately left out of the process thus far. Al-Daghim even remarked that the SDF will not be invited because they “are not representative of those living in eastern Syria.” Al-Daghim also noted that the SDF needs to be dissolved and join the army, thereby remaining in line with Damascus’ approach to engaging the SDF so far. Indeed, while armed factions and political groups across Syria have agreed to (at least officially) dissolve themselves, the SDF and DAANES continue to insist that they will only join a larger Syrian army as a distinct bloc that retains its current structure – and a certain level of autonomy. This impasse has persisted over the past weeks; the longer it lasts, the more the SDF and  DAANES risk being excluded from the conference and political process altogether. This risk is further compounded by failing to achieve tangible progress in establishing a united Kurdish front, and possible fragmentation as a result. A sign of this fragmentation could be seen in the recent withdrawal of the Kurdish National Council (KNC) from the Syrian National Coalition (SNC). While this move was publicly done to protest the treatment of Kurds in SIG-controlled areas, it was also likely taken as a manoeuvre to position itself as a party capable of engaging Damascus independent of the SNC – or even the SDF/DAANES. Indeed, while the KNC issued a public statement in which it criticized the manner in which the committee was formed, news recently emerged about a meeting between members of the KNC and al-Daghim in Damascus.

Efforts to overcome the current Damascus-SDF/DAANES impasse has been mounting over the past weeks. Most recently, a delegation from Turkey’s pro-Kurdish DEM party visited Erbil and met with Masoud Barazani, sharing a message from Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) leader, Abdullah Ocalan, in which he expressed hopes that Barazani would intensify efforts to negotiate a Turkish-PKK de-escalation deal, which would yield significant impact on the trajectory of the SDF’s stalemate with Damascus. But time is ticking. Although no date has been set for the National Conference, pressure is mounting on all parties to resolve the impasse.

Syria's Economy in Transition: Stagnation Despite Currency Improvements

The depreciation of the Syrian pound (SYP) against the American dollar (USD) has contributed to the continued deterioration of the country's economic environment since the start of the Syrian crisis in 2011. In 2010, USD 1 equaled SYP 45-50; by 2024, it had reached SYP 15,000. While a sharp deterioration occurred on December 8, 2024 with the ouster of Bashar al-Assad’s regime (reaching SYP 27,000), the exchange rate soon began to show signs of recovery. These improvements have continued into the first two months of 2025, with the official exchange rate set at SYP 13,200 per 1 USD on February 10.

Despite these improvement, market activity and overall economic conditions remain stagnant and – by some accounts – has worked since the fall of the al-Assad regime. Explaining this discrepancy requires an examination of a number of factors contributing to the Syrian pound’s historical decline, as well as recent rapid rate of improvement.

SYP's 14-Year Decline

The comparative value of a currency is determined by a range of factors, including Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as well as a country's balance between its total imports and exports. In the years leading up to the Syrian uprising in 2011, many of these factors were declining in Syria, with these conditions worsening over the over the 14 years of conflict that following, seeing the GDP dropping from USD 61 billion in 2010 to approximately 8 billion in 2023. Meanwhile, Syria faced an ongoing trade deficit, with exports amounting to approximately 31% of its exports in 2023. The sanctions imposed on the regime also contributed to the currency's deterioration; in 2019, the value of the SYP per USD 1 was 1,000, but following the implementation of the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act in 2020 (and the myriad sanctions it entailed), this rate rose to SYP to 1,300 by mid-2022.

Rapid But Superficial Improvement

A number of factors have contribute to the improved value of the SYP since December 8. Following the issuing of General License 24 on January 8, 2025, the official exchange rate set by the Syrian Central Bank (SYP 13,065 : USD 1) was – for the first time in many years – more favorable than that of the black market (SYP 11,600). Since then, several bilateral and multilateral international actors, including the European Union, have expressed support for an easing and eventual lifting of sanctions.

This improvement in political conditions has not however led to any improvements in economic conditions. Thus far, the country has not yet seen any improvements in its productive, import, or export activity. Likewise, increased levels of foreign aid and investment have not yet materialized. Meanwhile, the interim authorities in Damascus have introduced a number of policies to garner greater recognition as a transitional government, but they have yielded some adverse consequences, at least in the short term, to the local market. One example is the introduction of an updated customs policy and new list of associated fees for the import of more than 6,000 items. The policy also aimed to standardize customs across Syria’s various crossings (which are now now controlled by one authority); however, the policy was met with substantial dissatisfaction because it led to a sharp increase in custom fees on goods imported through Syria’s northwestern crossings.

Changes in Custom Fees on Select Products Following New Policy on January 11, 2025

Item	Previous Import Fee (USD)	New Import Fee (USD)
Cement	17 (ton)	34 (ton)
Iron	60 (ton)	120 (ton)
Gasoline	30 (1,000 liters)	210 (1,000 liters)
Flour	2 (ton)	20 (ton)
Sugar	10 (ton)	50 (ton)

Improved Value, Diminished Availability

While it could be argued that encouraging the import of goods that were previously unavailable at sufficient quantities locally constitutes a positive decision, the development may also raise concerns regarding the ability of local products to compete with goods imported from Turkey. Moreover, while the appreciation of SYP exchange rates may benefit importers, it could also present challenges for those exporting Syrian goods.

Similarly, while having an official exchange rate that is a more favorable than the unofficial/black market rate was initially seen as a positive development, it also introduced concerns. Namely, while the Central Bank in Damascus continues to set a favorable rate, it also introduced a number of restrictions that have limited the availability of SYP in the market. For instance, restrictions have been put in place to limit daily withdrawals from personal bank accounts (between SYP 250,000-500,000 SYP – approximately USD 19-38). The Central Bank also imposed demanding conditions (a deposit of USD 20 million in some cases) on private currency-exchange offices and companies, resulting in many of them having to shut down a large number thereof. At the same time, with little availability of local currency at the official rate, many Syrians have been forced to burn through their savings or exchange money they receive via remittance through unofficial vendors due to a lack of alternatives.

Difficult Path Ahead

There is continued speculation about the depth of research that informs the interim authorities' financial policies – as well as the motivations driving the policy. Many local observers believe that a large number of the policies concerning the local currency aim to (1) maximize the interim authorities' control over the exchange rate across the country, and (2) replenish funds available for the state to deliver on some very ambitious economic promises (including a 400% pay raise to employees in the public sector, which has yet to take effect). While some observers have argued that these measures as temporary but necessary for Syria's transition, criticism has also been levelled against the measures. For instance, they have suggested that the continued presence of unregulated exchange vendors in the streets is allowing the black market to control the de facto exchange rate in many places. Similarly, while the drawbacks of strict and stringent economic policy may have been agreeable immediate after the fall of al-Assad, the continued deterioration of economic conditions across the country could detract from any good will the interim authorities have cultivated with the public. As such, more detailed and collaboratively designed economic and financial strategies need to be designed and verified to ensure that the current economic difficulties are temporary growing pains.